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The price of being a country is willingness to bear a cross. For Germany it 
is the cross of beastliness; for Russia it is stolidity; the United States must 
rise above material wealth; and Canada is required to find a national identity. 
The burden which Newfoundland has carried is to justify that it should have 
any people. From the Western Adventurers of the seventeenth century to 
Canadian economists in the twentieth, there has been a continuing debate 
as to how many, if any, people should live in Newfoundland. The consensus 
has normally been that there should be fewer Newfoundlanders — a con-
clusion reached in the seventeenth century when there were only some 2,000 
inhabitants, and one which is drawn today when there are over 500,000. 
Newfoundland's economic history has centred around valuation of its 
natural resource endowment in relation to the size of its population. The 
particular object of debate has been (and still is) the size and well-being of the 
traditional or rural economy, and the likelihood that it could expand exten-
sively at acceptable standards of life, or that other sectors can be developed 
to absorb labour exports from the traditional sector. The economic charac-
teristics of a traditional economy can be stated simply enough. Labour and 
natural resources, or 'land', are the most important factors of production, 
and capital plays a very minor role. If it is assumed that land is a constant, 
then the average output of labour is a simple function of the ratio of labour to 
land. Thus, if the population expands and the ratio increases, then average 
per capita output falls; that is, standards of living fall. If it is further assumed 
that the economy is closed to emigration, then the prospects are those of 
deteriorating standards to a very low level of physical security and comfort. 
To make matters still more depressing, a once-and-for-all technical improve-
ment in the traditional economy (say the introduction of the cod trap) which 
shifts average per capita output upwards, is of little long-term benefit, for the 
gains in living standards will be eaten away by the likelihood of strengthened 
population growth: one ends up with a larger economy, but not necessarily 
a more prosperous one. The only routes to a long-run improvement in living 
standards are a widening resource base and technical change (including or-
ganizational changes such as the growth of domestic and international market 
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activity).1 These assumptions imply a movement away from the traditional 
economy with capital growth (both reproducible and human) defining the 
growth of total and per capita income. 
The stark features of this simple model obviously fail to capture accurately 
the complexities of Newfoundland's economic history. Yet it does identify 
some realities of its economic problems and, what is just as important, 
perceptions of the problems. When Newfoundland's traditional economy 
reached an apparent limit to extensive expansion in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, a struggle was waged to expand the resource base and 
modernize both the structure of production and the composition of output. 
This campaign ended in collapse and that collapse led directly to union with 
Canada. In 1949 the effort to 'develop' was resumed under new constitutional 
dress. But the historical record sketched in this essay suggests that Confedera-
tion did not introduce any especially new perceptions of Newfoundland's 
economic problems and potential, and some might argue that it simply re-
inforced a depressing tendency to neglect the province's most obvious natural 
resource — the sea. 
At the time of its discovery Newfoundland's fishery was an international 
open access resource, exploited by fleets from France, Portugal and Spain. 
At this time (unlike today) the volume of factors of production available to 
exploit the resource, the primitive techniques, and the size of the markets, 
meant the resource base was in no danger of over-exploitation in the sense of 
significant reductions in maximum sustainable yield. For the continental 
countries, the adoption of a 'green cure' meant the issue of settling Newfound-
land did not arise, since the Island was mainly a convenient watering and re-
pair station. But this was not the case with the West of England fishery, 
which developed in the second half of the sixteenth century.2 Whether in 
response to relatively high costs of salt or to local tradition, the West Country 
fisherman pursued a light salted, sun dried fishery at Newfoundland. Land 
resources were consequently important to the Westcountrymen, as wood 
was needed for flakes and stages, and shore facilities for drying. The con-
sequences of this technology were two-fold: first, an undignified annual rush 
by the West of England fishing boats to Newfoundland to claim seasonal 
property rights over the best fishing 'rooms'; and secondly, opposition to 
establishment of 'plantations' or any other settlement of the Island, whether 
by Englishmen or foreigners, which would prejudice seasonal claims to owner-
ship over essential land inputs. 
1 See C. H. Fei and Gustav Ranis, "Economic Development in Historical Perspective", 
American Economic Review, LIX (1969), pp. 386 - 400. 
2 On this point see K. Matthews, "A History of the West of England-Newfoundland Fishery" 
(Unpublished D.Phil, thesis, Oxford University, 1968). 
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The short fishing season and poor winter employment opportunities in 
Newfoundland as well as the grim agricultural potential, favoured a migratory 
fishery; but very slowly in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies the difference in the rates of return between a migratory and a settled 
fishery shifted in favour of the latter. Rising European shipping costs and the 
development of regular and lower cost supplies of food and other imports 
from the North American colonies, were critical factors in this shift. Nonethe-
less the growth of a resident population was painfully slow. In 1650 it was 
around 2,000 and by 1750, with sharp fluctuations, reached only 6,000. The 
turning point came in the second half of the eighteenth century. The French 
fishery declined after the Seven Years' War and the New England fishery 
following the Revolution, and neither fully recovered until the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars. By the end of the century the West Country merchants had 
translated an international migratory fishery at Newfoundland into a colonial 
industry in Newfoundland. Between 1750 and 1804 Newfoundland's popula-
tion grew at an annual rate of 2.3% reaching over 20,000 and in the next 
twelve years more than doubled to 50,000, implying a growth rate of over 
8% per annum.3 
The transition from a British fishery at Newfoundland to a Newfoundland 
fishery was significant in two ways. It meant the foundation of a new country 
in the world, for while it is customary (at least in Newfoundland) to claim a 
history of many hundreds of years, it is more realistic to view Newfoundland 
as one of the nineteenth-century countries of European settlement. Secondly, 
while there was always a possibility (however remote up to the nineteenth 
century) that an expanding migratory fishery would deplete an open access 
resource, there was now a better possibility that a settled traditional economy 
would expand to the point of impoverishing a country. 
The inshore salt cod industry dominated Newfoundland's economic history 
in the nineteenth century and continued to be the single most important 
source of employment and market income well into the twentieth. Table 1 
is the basis for suggesting that in terms of the gross value of (export) produc-
tion, prices and physical output, there were three long cycles running be-
tween 1815 and 1934: the first covering 1815/19 to 1850/54; the second 
between 1855/60 to 1895/99; and a third between 1900/04 to 1930/34. Mean 
volumes, prices and export values tended to be higher in each period, but as 
Table 2 indicates fluctuations around the means were extreme, especially 
with respect to prices and export values. It is clear that prices were more 
volatile than physical production, and that on a quinquennial basis gross 
export values were less stable than either output or prices. The industry was 
obviously an unstable one upon which to found a country's external earnings 
3 Calculated from figures in S. Ryan, "Collections of CO. 194 Statistics" (unpublished manu-
script, Newfoundland Studies Centre, Memorial University, 1970). 
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and such a large fraction of its national income, and it is hardly surprising 
that with responsible government politicians launched an effort to widen the 
country's production base. 
TABLE 1 
QUINQUENNIAL AVERAGES AND VARIATIONS IN SALT COD EXPORT 
VOLUMES, PRICES AND GROSS VALUES 1815/19 -1930/34 
PERIOD 
1815-19 
1820-24 
1825-29 
1830-34 
1835-39 
1840-44 
1845-49 
1850-54 
1855-59 
1860-64 
1865-69 
1870-74 
1875-79 
1880-84 
1885-89 
1890-94 
1895-99 
1900-04 
1905-09 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
VOLUMES 
(000 Quintals 
X 
1,018 
883 
923 
763 
788 
944 
963 
955 
1,205 
1,172 
969 
1,273 
1,134 
1,460 
1,192 
1,101 
1,224 
1,302 
1,574 
1,346 
1,517 
1,499 
1,398 
1,179 
S 
50 
30 
37 
110 
65 
59 
115 
108 
128 
140 
81 
175 
132 
70 
112 
70 
81 
78 
112 
122 
250 
183 
162 
52 
V 
5% 
3 
4 
14 
8 
6 
12 
11 
11 
12 
8 
14 
12 
5 
9 
6 
7 
6 
7 
9 
16 
12 
12 
4 
1 PRICES 
($ per Quintal) 
X 
3.90 
2.46 
2.08 
2.42 
2.78 
2.79 
2.66 
2.61 
3.33 
2.65 
3.86 
3.93 
3.88 
3.82 
3.66 
3.60 
2.89 
4.19 
N/A 
5.66 
9.35 
8.67 
8.37 
5,90 
S 
1.07 
0.23 
0.11 
0.32 
0.04 
0.13 
0.16 
0.38 
0.34 
0.50 
0.45 
0.02 
0.31 
0.13 
0.52 
0.04 
0.16 
0.03 
N/A 
0.51 
2.80 
2.29 
0.76 
1.87 
V 
27% 
9 
5 
13 
1 
5 
6 
15 
10 
14 
12 
0.5 
8 
3 
14 
1 
5 
0.6 
N/A 
9 
30 
26 
9 
32 
GROSS EXPORT VALUE 
(000 Dollars 
X 
2,968 
2,175 
1,942 
1,840 
2,193 
2,637 
2,547 
2,454 
4,008 
4,218 
3,731 
5,026 
4,354 
5,582 
4,316 
3,957 
3,549 
5,562 
N/A 
7,583 
15,650 
13,265 
11,587 
7,010 
X 
1,429 
224 
174 
326 
201 
216 
226 
161 
605 
266 
450 
896 
432 
615 
374 
461 
559 
289 
N/A 
599 
6,030 
4,974 
584 
2,464 
1 
V 
48% 
10 
9 
18 
9 
8 
9 
7 
15 
6 
12 
18 
10 
11 
9 
12 
16 
5 
N/A 
8 
41 
37 
5 
35 
NOTES: X - Arithmetic Mean 
S — Standard Deviation 
V - Coefficient of Variability (V = S/X . 100) 
SOURCE: Calculated from Government of Newfoundland, Historical Statistics of 
Newfoundland (St. John's, 1970), vol. I, Table K-7. 
TABLE 2 
MEAN VALUES OF QUINQUENNIAL COEFFICIENTS 
OF VARIATION FOR THE SALT COD INDUSTRY 
PERIOD 
1815/19 - 1930/34 
1855/59 - 1895/99 
1900/04 - 1930/34 
VOLUMES 
% 
8.88 
9.33 
9.43 
PRICES 
% 
11.09 
7.50 
17.77 
GROSS VALUES 
% 
15.57 
12.11 
21.83 
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Although high volumes, prices and export values characterized the cod 
fishery in the first years of the century, output volumes grew by only 0.08% 
per annum from the mid-1820s to mid-1850s, and in four out of six quinquen-
nia were below the trend for 1805/08-1915/20. During the same period prices 
rose by only 0.13% per annum and in-five quinquennia were below trend for 
1821/25-1900/04. Accordingly, the value of cod exports grew by only 0.9% per 
annum and in all six quinquennia was below trend for 1805/09-1900/14.4 Over 
the same period population grew at slightly over 2.5% per annum, and the 
apparent depression of the first half of the century would appear worse if the 
initial benchmark for measurements was the values of 1809/15 — a quin-
quennia when many people were encouraged to migrate to Newfoundland. 
But it does not follow necessarily that for the economy as a whole the produc-
tivity of labour and living standards were falling. It is possible that a decline 
in per capita export values was compensated by a general decline in unit 
costs of imports, for while a U.S. wholesale price index for farm products rose 
from 59 in 1826/30 to 84 in 1851/55 (with a dip to 55 in 1841/45), a United 
Kingdom merchandise export price index fell from 169 in 1826/30 to 104 in 
1851/525. Moreover, within Newfoundland the rapid growth of the seal fishery 
softened the depression in the cod fishery, and it is also a reasonable hypo-
thesis that over the period some fraction of total domestic expenditure was 
shifted from imports to domestic production. In addition to the non-market 
output which a rural community could generate through increasing familiarity 
with its environment, the very rapid growth of St. John's (reaching some 20% 
of the population by 1857) suggests development of import substituting com-
modity and service production. 
Between the grant of responsible government in 1855 and the mid-1880s, 
Newfoundland's basic industry flourished, although there were always bad 
years, frequently coupled with indifferent ones. But prices grew by 1.17% per 
annum in 1850/54-1880/84 and were above the trend referred to earlier in 
every quinquennia. Volumes grew by 1.25% per annum and were above trend 
in four out of six quinquennia. Accordingly, over the same interval, export 
values grew by 2.14% per annum and were above the trend in each quin-
quennia. Over the period 1857-1884 population growth decelerated to an 
annual rate slightly over 1.7%. Furthermore, while according to the censuses 
the labour force (occupied population) was growing at just over 2% per an-
num, the male fishing labour force grew by only 1.7%. Thus, the industry's 
4 Calculated from Government of Newfoundland, Historical Statistics of Newfoundland and 
Labrador (St. John's, 1970), vol. I, Table K-7. 
5 Calculated from Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States 
(Washington, 1962), Series El-12; and B. R. Mitchell, Abstract of British Historical Statistics 
(Cambridge, 1962), ch. XI, Table 15. It is a reasonable assumption that wholesale prices for 
Canadian farm products which Newfoundland bought moved in directions similar to the 
American. 
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share in total employment fell from 90% in 1857 to 82% in 1884, and the im-
plication (under the assumption of constant factor proportions) is a modest 
growth in total productivity. The trend in living standards, however, is 
unclear. The U.S. wholesale price index for farm products rose sharply from 
83 in 1856/60 to 117 and 130 in the two quinquennia of the 1860s, then fell 
to 86 in 1880/84. The U.K. merchandise export price index moved in the 
same direction, rising from 110 in 1856/60 to a plateau of about 126 in the 
three quinquennia between 1861-75 and then falling off to 93 in 1881/85. But 
whatever the implications of the terms of trade for living standards, behind 
the growth rates for the fishing economy an alarming situation was emerging. 
The absolute level of employment in the fishing industry grew from some 
38,500 men in 1857 to around 60,400 in 1884, and fishing rooms in use ex-
panded from some 6,000 to around 10,5006. This meant that the average 
volume of production per fisherman was falling from around 30 quintals in 
the 1850s and 60s to a low of some 23 quintals in the late 1880s, after which 
there was a modest recovery.7 We know little about trends in man-hours 
among fishermen and the growth of employed capital, and it is therefore 
difficult to be certain about changes in labour and total factor productivity. 
But contemporaries were convinced that the traditional fishing economy had 
reached a limit to extensive growth. 
The size of national income produced by this traditional economy is im-
possible to estimate precisely. In 1884 the value of all exports was S6.6M and 
almost all of this was accounted for by fish products — notably salt codfish 
and oil, while the remainder consisted of mineral and other primary product 
shipments.8 Primary employment (the export sector) accounted for 87% of 
the labour force, the secondary sector some 10% and the service sector some 
3%.9 If we assume that the value of output in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors was a proportional fraction of their labour forces to the realized out-
put of the primary sector, then the realized national income would be around 
$7.5M.10 There was a great deal of production in rural Newfoundland, how-
ever, that did not move through markets. In the late 1930s it was estimated 
that income in kind amounted to some 55% of the value of fish exports.1'If the 
6 Tenth Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1935, Part I, vol. II, p. 87. 
7 Calculated from loc. cit. 
8 P. Copes, "Role of the Fishing Industry in the Economic Development of Newfoundland" 
(unpublished manuscript, Newfoundland Studies Centre, 1970), Table 3. 
9 Calculated from Tenth Census of Newfoundland, op. cit. 
10 By 'realized' output is meant that fraction which enters into markets. For estimates of 
'National Cash Income' in this period see Steven D. Antler, "Colonialism as a Factor in the 
Economic Stagnation of Nineteenth Century Newfoundland: Some Preliminary Notes" (un-
published manuscript, Newfoundland Studies Centre, 1973), Table 3. 
11 R. A. MacKay, ed., Newfoundland: Economic, Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (Toronto, 
1946), Anonymous, Appendix B. 
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same proportion of non-market income was produced in 1884, then this would 
add some $4.1 M to the realized national income, for a total national income 
of some $11.6M and a per capita income of around $60. Probably this is a low 
estimate. If realized income accounted for, say, only around half of a fishing 
family's total income, then the output of factors in the secondary and tertiary 
sectors should be at least doubled (otherwise there would have been migra-
tion from the urban to rural sector), yielding a realized national income of 
$8.4M and a total national income of around $12.5M. Even this figure may 
underestimate the national income, for despite the strains of the Depression 
period, impressionistic evidence suggests the economy was less oriented to 
markets in the nineteenth century than during the 1930s. At the later date a 
smaller fraction of the labour force was geographically and occupationally 
situated to generate income in kind and consumption patterns were by then 
more oriented through taste and availability of cash towards marketed food-
stuffs and manufactures. Thus as an 'outside' estimate, if we impute an in-
come in kind at least equal in value to that of primary exports, then the 
estimate of national income rises to around $15M with income per capita 
of $75.12 
Even if this high estimate is accepted, then it is clear that Newfoundland's 
traditional economy was by no means an affluent component of the North 
Atlantic world. Comparisons are fraught with dangers, but as a rough indica-
tor, it can be noted that Canada's per capita national income in 1880 (with-
out adjustment for income in kind) was around $135.13 It is probably true that 
with a more sophisticated and market oriented economy, the burden of 
capital depreciation and taxation on personal incomes was higher in Canada 
than in Newfoundland at this time,- nonetheless the gap in average material 
well-being must have been substantial. 
Newfoundland's traditional economy underwent a crisis in the late 1880s 
and 1890s. Export prices for salt codfish sank from $3.82 a quintal in 1880/84 
to $2.89 in 1895/99 — a collapse of around 32%. Production volumes also fell 
from about 1.5M quintals in 1880/84 to some 1.2M in 1895/99 - a 20% de-
cline. Accordingly, industry gross earnings sagged from $5.6M to $3.6M — 
a decline of 36%.14 But the impact on the real level of national income and 
per capita consumption was probably less severe than these figures suggest. 
Table 3 represents a rough indicator of Newfoundland's terms of trade up to 
the end of World War I for the fishing sector. It suggests that the terms of 
trade actually moved in Newfoundland's favour in the two quinquennia 
12 More accurately, this is an estimate of total domestic income as no allowance has been 
made for depreciation and the balance of net property income from abroad. 
13 Calculated from M. C. Urquhart and K. A. H. Buckley, Historical Statistics of Canada 
(Toronto, 1965), Series E2.4-244. 
14 Calculated from Historical Statistics of Newfoundland, Table K-7. 
Acadiensis 63 
1884-94 relative to the 1870s and first half of the 1880s, although there was 
a sharp deterioration during 1895-99. But the point remains that employment 
levels reached in 1884 could not be maintained, quite apart from the addition-
al burden of absorbing into the traditional economy increments from natural 
increase. The male labour force engaged in catching and curing fish fell back 
from an historic peak of 60,000 in 1884 to just under 37,000 in 1891. Employ-
ment inched up again during the prosperous first decade of this century and 
reached almost 44,000 in 1911; but then it began a slow decline to some 
35,000 in 1935.15 
The sharp decline in employment in the traditional economy after 1884 
and its relative stability during the first half of this century, was achieved in 
part through the absorption of labour into other sectors; but a major contribu-
tion also came through slower rates of growth of population and labour force. 
Whereas in 1874-84 population grew at a rate of 2.1% per annum, it was close 
to stationary in 1885-91 at 0.3% and remained below 1% per annum until 
World War II.16 Deceleration of population growth was not principally a 
function of changes in fertility or mortality. The crude birth rate was around 
30 per thousand in 1884, 33 in 1891 and 35 in 1901. The crude death rate 
which was 14 per thousand in 1884 rose to 22 in 1891 and fell back to 15 in 
1901.17 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the crude birth rate was above 20 
per thousand — in the high twenties during the relatively prosperous 1920s 
and the low twenties during the Depression — while the crude death rate 
fluctuated around 12 per thousand.18 It follows that population and labour 
force growth could only have been held down by substantial net emigration. 
Trends in net migration can be estimated by noting population levels at 
census periods and imputing what it should have been with no migration at 
the estimated Rate of Natural Increase. By this method, net immigration at an 
annual average of less than 1000 prevailed between 1869-84. But from 1884 
to 1935 a large flow of emigrants began. Between 1884-1901 it probably 
ranged between 1,500 to 2,500 per year, and from 1901 to 1945 between 1,000 
to 1,500 per year.19 
15 Calculated from Tenth Census of Newfoundland, op. cit. 
16 Historical Statistics of Newfoundland, Table A-l. 
17 Calculated from Census of Newfoundland, 1901, Table J, p. XVII. The sharp increase in the 
death rate in 1891 may represent an unusual year or a weakness in the census. 
18 Dominion Bureau of Statistics [hereafter DBS], Province of Newfoundland Statistical 
Background (Ottawa, 1949), Tables 21 and 22. 
19 Sources for these estimates are the Census of Newfoundland, 1901, 1911 and 1935; and DBS, 
Statistical Background, Table 23. Michael Staveley, "Migration and Mobility in Newfound-
land and Labrador: A Study in Population Geography" (Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univer-
sity of Alberta, 1973), p. 71, also concludes that a flood of emigration began around 1884. 
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It is clear that the 1880s is an important benchmark in Newfoundland's 
economic history. The traditional economy reached a limit to its extensive 
growth and further development was perceived as a function of the emer-
gence of modern resource industries, with emigration acting as a mechanism 
to balance a labour force growing faster than employment opportunities. 
Since the acquisition of responsible government in 1855, the ever pressing 
task which confronted ministries was to raise market incomes in the tradi-
tional sector and to substitute domestic job creation for the humiliating, costly 
and enervating mechanism of emigration. Indeed, during the decades when 
the traditional economy was approaching its maximum extensive growth, 
government had begun to search for a development strategy which would 
reduce the rate of inshore fishery expansion and initiate its relative decline. 
The most famous statement of this goal was the report of the Whiteway Com-
mittee which declared that "no material increase of means is to be looked for 
from our fisheries, and . . . we must direct our attention to the growing re-
quirements of the country."20 The strategy the committee proposed con-
tained the essential features of the national development policy pursued by 
all nineteenth-century territories of European settlement.21 Through rail-
way technology the country would be shaken free from dependence upon 
coastal resources, and a moving frontier of inland settlement would open 
export sectors in agriculture and minerals — resources whose existence in 
Newfoundland was confirmed by geological survey. There was also a hint in 
the committee's report that St. John's would provide a market for country 
products, and presumably with the growth of the latter, would emerge as 
a centre of domestic manufacturing. At one stroke, a blow was dealt to the 
one product export economy and the income leakages resulting from high 
foreign trade dependence. In general, Newfoundland's economic problem 
was seen not as an actual or approaching over-abundance of labour relative 
to resources, but of labour relative to resources currently being exploited. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century this strategy was pursued with 
a legislative ferocity which took second place to no developing country. In 
1873 a Homestead Law was passed to encourage "Agriculture and the more 
speedy settlement of the Wilderness" and the Companies Corporation Act 
provided the legal framework for establishing limited liability companies 
in manufacturing, mining and commerce. In 1875 a system of bounties was 
introduced to speed up land clearance and cultivation. Two years later there 
was an "Act for the Encouragement of Manufacturing" providing subsidies 
on imports of flax, cotton and wool used in fishing gear and textiles. An act of 
20 "Report of the Select Committee to Consider and Report upon the Construction of a 
Railway", Journal of the House of Assembly, 1880, p. 126. 
21 For a discussion of this point see A. J. Youngson, "The Opening up of New Territories", 
Cambridge Economic History (Cambridge, 1966), vol. VI, Part I, ch. 3. 
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1880 offered large blocks of land to licensees who would settle farming 
families. In the same year the Receiver General was authorized to issue de-
bentures for construction of a railway from St. John's to Notre Dame Bay, 
and in the next year the first railway contract was brought down for a line 
to Halls Bay with branches to Conception Bay. The 1880 session also intro-
duced one of many bounty schemes to encourage ship building for the Bank 
fishery, and legislation was passed in 1882 providing assistance to New York 
promotors to establishing the Newfoundland Dock Company — the railway 
and drydock being the two great infastructure investments of the late nine-
teenth century.22 
The 1882 session included a flight of fancy, in legislation for the "Great 
American and European Short Line Railway". It provided the promotors 
with incentives to build a southern line from St. John's to the Southwest Coast, 
there to link up by steamer with railways to be built or running rights to be 
acquired, through Eastern Canada and the United States — a scheme perhaps 
no more ridiculous in its historical context than the Canadian dream of an 
Imperial transportation link between Europe and the Orient. In any case, it 
was an early manifestation of Newfoundland's continuing fascination with its 
supposed locational advantages in the North Atlantic. In 1884 an act closely 
modeled on Canadian legislation provided for the survey of Newfoundland 
into townships, sections and quartersections, with a further development of 
homesteading, mining and forestry law. This was followed two years later 
by an "Act for the Promotion of Agriculture" which established agricultural 
districts under the direction of a superintendent and staff to direct settlement, 
road building and other public works as well as the promotion of scientific 
agriculture. In 1889 these measures were supplemented by the establishment 
of a Board of Agriculture to supervise local agricultural societies, and found 
a model farm to introduce improved stock, seeds and farm equipment.23 In 
1896 the trans-insular railway was completed, but the decade saw the pro-
jection of fresh schemes including a line from the Canadian border to the 
Labrador coast. 
Throughout the late nineteenth century the St. John's newspapers followed 
the progress of secondary manufacturing, giving close attention to technical 
accomplishments, the level of employment and the likelihood of staunching 
imports. Gaden's Ginger Ale Factory was applauded for beating out imported 
mineral waters. The carriage factory of Messrs. W. R. Oke and Sons was 
hailed for developing a wooden tricycle for the French Consul which could 
be marketed at a quarter the cost of steel models. Archibald's Tobacco 
22 For the statutes embodying these provisions see Statutes of Newfoundland, 36 Vict., c.7, 
c.8; 38 Vict., c.18; 40 Vict., c.10; 43 Vict., c.3, c.4; 44 Vict., c.2; 43 Vict., c.5; and 45 Vict., 
c.3. 
23 See ibid., 45 Vict., c.4; 47 Vict., c.2; 49 Vict., c.3; and 52 Vict., c.8. 
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Works, employing some 120 people, produced a Newfoundland plug tobacco. 
Stained glass, with designs in a national idiom, was made by the Newfound-
land Glass Embossing Company. Newfoundland fruit was bottled in a new 
factory on Mundy Pond Road and samples were sent to the Queen with the 
hope of acquiring a royal appointment. Boots and shoes were turned out in a 
plant at Riverhead in St. John's employing close to 150 people, and since its 
work could "compare more than favourable with work turned out in any part 
of the world" it was anticipated that imports would be reduced.24 The 
seriousness with which manufacturing development was viewed was symbol-
ized by a government decision in 1891 to fund an Industrial Exhibition at St. 
John's "for the encouragement of the national and mechanical products of 
this colony."25 
Like Canada's National Policy, Newfoundland's first development strategy 
envisioned a moving frontier of agricultural settlement (facilitated by invest-
ments in inland transportation) linked to an initially protected and subsidized 
industrial sector. The results were disappointing. Improved acreage doubled 
from 36,000 acres in 1874 to 86,000 in 1901, but on a per capita basis this 
meant a growth from only 0.28 acres to 0.32.26 Similarly, there was modest 
growth in the livestock population — from 90,000 cows and cattle to 148,000, 
and from 180,000 sheep to 350,000 — but the country had hardly made a dent 
in its domestic import bill and certainly had not emerged as one of the world's 
frontiers of agricultural investment.27 In the industrial sector the value of 
factory output per capita grew from only $10 in 1884 to $12 in 1901 and $14 
in 1911.28 It is, accordingly, a reasonable conclusion that agriculture and 
secondary manufacturing developments brought no important shifts in the 
composition of output. Nonetheless, the structure of employment in the 
country was significantly different in 1911 compared with 1884, as shown in 
Table 4. Between these dates almost 30% of the labour force — a growing 
labour force — was shifted out of fishing and into other occupations. Over 
half of this 30% represented small gains to defined primary, secondary and 
service occupations, while the other 13% was accounted for by the census 
aggregate 'Others'. This category likely included workers in a variety of 
personal service occupations, although the sharp increase in the category 
between 1884 and 1891 suggests another analysis which supports its allocation 
24 I am grateful to Mrs. B. Robertson of the Newfoundland Historical Association for drawing 
my attention to these references. See The Daily Colonist, 30, 9 July 1887; 1 April, 13 Sep-
tember 1886; 8 October 1888; 4 June 1889. 
25 54 Vict., c.lO. 
26 Calculated from Census of Newfoundland, 1911, vol. I, Table XXI. 
27 Ibid., Table XXII. 
28 Ibid., Table XXIII. Some large firms, however, did not report, such as Reid-Newfoundland, 
Angel Engineering and A. Harvey. 
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to secondary employment. Between 1884 and 1891 railway construction and 
a number of urban service projects got underway, and the upswing in the 
category 'Others' probably reflects the emergence of a large labour force 
in transportation, communications, public utilities and construction. If this 
is so, then a large share of employment diversification in this period was 
secured by a flow of public, and largely foreign private funds, into capital 
projects. Indeed it was two of the largest of these investments — the Bell 
Island iron mine and the Harmsworth newsprint plant at Grand Falls — 
which accounted for the decline in fish products as a percentage of exports 
(despite rising values from 1900) from over 90% in the 1880s to less than 70% 
by the opening of the War. 
It is very probable that gross domestic product grew substantially in real 
terms between the mid-1880s and 1911. But the gains to gross national 
product and to personal incomes would be less dramatic; for both the rail-
way, the new resource industries, and the expanding urban services must 
have increased the gross investment ratio and introduced for the first time 
into the Newfoundland economy substantial payments abroad for technology, 
capital and entrepreneurship. 
The assumptions guiding Newfoundland's first development strategy were 
akin to those shaping the nineteenth-century territories of settlement. The 
weight of development was to be assumed by Newfoundlanders — native 
born and immigrants — accumulating capital and absorbing modern tech-
nology through the formation and expansion of small agricultural and in-
dustrial enterprises. Their efforts would be complemented by footloose 
entrepreneurs who, with government backing, would tackle large and com-
plex capital investments. These assumptions began to give way by the be-
ginning of the twentieth century. It is true that interest in native Newfound-
land enterprise remained strong in the St. John's newspapers. For example, in 
1912 excitement built up over the prospect of a rubber goods factory employ-
ing "all local capital", but it was abandoned when it was found that "the 
smallest plant which could be established . . . would produce enough stock 
in about four to five weeks to accommodate the demand."29 It was also 
suggested at various times that factory hands should boycott merchants 
who carried imported lines when local products were available.30 But the 
bulk of development legislation from the turn of the century was devoted 
not to the stimulation of local enterprise, but to a search for foreign, direct 
investment firms to develop modern resource industries through a package 
of advanced management and technology. 
The reasons for this shift are clear. The original development strategy had 
failed. The high cost of land clearance and fertilization of an acidic soil made 
29 The Daily News, 16 January 1912. 
30 The Evening Telegram, 9 July 1908. 
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the land marginal to Newfoundlanders and the European migrants who 
flooded into the prairie lands of Australia and South and North America. 
With manufacturing, the size of the domestic market doomed firms to sub-
optimal scale, and the absence of an industrial tradition in the country among 
capitalists and workers made it unlikely that Newfoundland firms would over-
come the difficulties of entering foreign markets to achieve optimum scale. 
The remaining avenue to development was primary manufacturing industries, 
where possession of a scarce natural resource provided cost advantages for 
entry into international markets. Unlike the fishing industry, however, the 
minimum size of the firm in modern resource-based manufacturing was large 
and Newfoundland, with its tiny national income, had neither the savings, 
the entrepreneurs, nor the skilled workers to launch and control such 
developments. 
The resulting wedding between Newfoundland and the international cor-
poration can be traced back to the nineteenth-century contracts for railways, 
the drydock and the Bell Island mines. But the volume of such contracts 
accelerated with the successful Anglo-Newfoundland Development Company 
agreement in 1905 for a paper mill at Grand Falls. In the following year the 
Marconi Company was given a monopoly over telegraphy in return for a com-
mitment to improve the Island's communications. In 1910 the "Coal Develop-
ment Act" provided the Newfoundland Exploration Syndicate with tariff 
guarantees on coal imports if the company established a commercial mine. 
A similar inducement was given in 1910 to the Newfoundland Oil Fields 
Limited of London. In 1911 the British-Canadian Explosives Company, also 
of London, was offered protection to establish a manufacturing plant of 
sufficient capacity at least to supply local demand. In the same year an agree-
ment was reached with the International Carbonizing Company to manufac-
ture peat fuel, and two Maine promoters were offered various inducements 
to build five cold storage plants for fish products. In the next year the 
American-Newfoundland Pulp and Paper Company of Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan, entered into an agreement for a pulp and paper mill at Deer Lake. In 
1913 the Orr Newfoundland Company was empowered to construct five re-
duction plants to manufacture glue and fertilizer from dogfish, while the 
Canadian North Atlantic Corporation revived an old vision of a railway from 
Quebec City to the Labrador coast.31 
The war years slowed down but did not staunch the flood of industrial 
promotions. In 1915 the Newfoundland-American Packing Company received 
concessions for cold storage facilities to pack fresh water fish, fruits and 
berries, and the Newfoundland Products Corporation was launched to manu-
facture fertilizers on the Humber. In the first year of peace the St. George's 
31 See Statutes of Newfoundland, 5 Ed. VII, c.9, c.8; 10 Ed. VII, c.23, c.24; 1 Geo. V, c . l l , 
c.20, c.22; 2 Geo. V, c.7; 3 Geo V, c.8, c.14. 
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Coal Fields Company revived the prospect of domestic coal supplies. In 1920 
the St. Lawrence Timber, Pulp and Steamship Company offered prospects 
for the development of pulp mills on Bonne Bay, while the Terra Nova Sul-
phite Company was planning a similar facility at Alexander Bay. In 1921 the 
D'Arcy Exploration Company was granted leases for oil exploration, while 
the Pulp and Paper Corporation of America proposed mills in Labrador — 
probably only to acquire rights to export pulpwood and pitprops. In 1923 an 
agreement with the Newfoundland Power and Paper Corporation resulted in 
the mill at Corner Brook — one concrete success. In 1924 the Newfoundland 
Milling Company was founded to mill cereals with a guarantee of a twenty 
year monopoly and tariff protection. In 1929 the Newfoundland Mines and 
Smelters Limited was granted concessions over a large part of the Avalon to 
mine and process lead, copper, zinc and other ores. In 1930 one of the most 
imaginative — and enduring — schemes was launched by the Great Lakes-
Atlantic Newfoundland Company for a transhipment port at Mortier Bay. 
In the last years, as the edifice of responsible government slipped away, the 
Terra Nova Oils Company was granted privileges to distil for export.32 
Each of the agreements had common threads. Any provision for Newfound-
land equity participation, either public or private, was absent. The Newfound-
land Government provided concessions in the form of Crown Land grants, 
drawbacks on duties on new construction materials, machinery and raw 
materials, tax holidays, and where applicable, the promise of protective 
tariffs. In return for these privileges, the companies promised to employ 
Newfoundland labour wherever possible and to invest certain minimum 
amounts over specified time periods — a guarantee which was commonly 
extended for further grace periods by amending legislation. But for all the 
hopes and effort embodied in these agreements, few resulted in any invest-
ment and still fewer in any permanent additions to the country's productive 
capacity. 
In contrast to the late nineteenth century, legislation involving Newfound-
land entrepreneurship was remarkably scarce and, with two exceptions, un-
original. In 1908 the Model Farm Act provided for an agricultural experi-
mental station to undertake original and applied research. In 1917 the New-
foundland Knitting Mills and the Riverside Woolen Mills, both apparently 
Newfoundland firms, were given relief from import duties on machinery and 
raw materials and a limited subsidy for fifteen years. In 1928 a Harbour Grace 
merchant was given a three year monopoly to establish a shark oil industry — 
a trade perhaps better fitted to some of the foreign concessionaires. A more 
promising direction was offered in the Tourist Commission Act of 1927 which 
32 Ibid., 6 Geo. V, c.3, c.4; 9 & 10 Geo. V, c.25; 11 Geo. V, c.6, c.2; 12 Geo. V, c.8, c.9; 14 
Geo. V, c.l; 15 Geo. V, c.l; 20 Geo. V, c.12; 21 Geo. V, c.6; 22 Geo. V, c.5; 23& 24 Geo. 
V, c.5. 
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established a public corporation drawing revenues from a tax on hotels, 
steamships and similar enterprises, to promote a tourist traffic and a "wider 
knowledge of the colony's natural resources". Undoubtedly the most impor-
tant legislation in these years seeking to upgrade the efficiency and returns 
to Newfoundland enterprise was the two acts which made up the Coaker 
Regulations.33 The acts established national quality controls in the produc-
tion of salt fish and an organized approach in the markets for all Newfound-
land output. Regrettably, the regulations foundered on divisions within the 
trade and were repealed in the following year.34 It was not until the economic 
collapse of the 1930s when prospects of attracting foreign capital for resource 
development dried up, that attention to fishery legislation revived. In the 
interval Newfoundland's position as the world's largest exporter of salt cod 
weakened in the face of a growing competitiveness in Scandinavia and the 
development of national fishing fleets in traditional importing countries.35 
"No colony of the British Empire", it was stated in 1910, "has made such 
progress in recent years as has Newfoundland." It was "one of the most pro-
gressive states in the Western hemisphere" and "no people in the world main-
tain a more comfortable and contented existence than the Newfoundland 
fishermen "36 Twenty years later, on the eve of Newfoundland's economic 
and political collapse, Joseph Smallwood wrote at length of the country as a 
budding industrial Michigan set down in a North Atlantic Arcadia.37 But the 
structural transformation so often planned, predicted and seen, had not in 
fact arrived. Between 1911 and 1935 Newfoundland's population grew from 
243,000 to 290,000, an annual rate of 0.8% as compared with about 1.7% in 
Canada. As a consequence of emigration, the labour force grew more slowly 
than population at an annual rate of 0.3%, whereas in Canada it grew faster 
than population at slightly over 1.8%.38 In other words, the demographic 
trends were not those of a country which had surmounted a development 
hump into modern economic growth. 
33 Ibid., 8 Ed. VII, c.7; 8 Geo. V, c.l, c.2; 18 Geo. V, c.l; 11 Geo. V, c.25, c.27. 
34 See Ian McDonald, "Coaker the Reformer" (unpublished manuscript, Newfoundland 
Studies Centre, 1975). 
35 See G. M. Gerhardsen and L. P. D. Gertenbach, Salt Cod and Related Species (Rome, 
Food and Agricultural Organization, 1949). 
36 Anon., "The Golden Age of Newfoundland's Advancement" (n.p., 1910), pp. 1, 8. Internal 
evidence suggests this to be a Harmsworth promotional pamphlet. 
37 J. R. Smallwood, The New Newfoundland (New York, 1931). 
38 The Canadian rate is calculated for employed population 1911-31. The dependency ratio 
was not, however, remarkably different. Both countries had heavy child dependency ratios 
of 35% in Newfoundland in 1935 and 31% in Canada for 1931. That the Newfoundland ratio 
was not more unfavourable may be attributable to the apparently higher infant mortality rate 
(see DBS, Statistical Background, Table 24) and differing marriage and fertility patterns. 
Whatever the explanation, the occupied labour force was 34% of the population in 1911 and 
only 30% in 1935. 
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The foreign trade statistics appeared, superficially, to indicate considerable 
growth and diversification. Exports and re-exports grew from S11.7M in 
1906/10 to a peak of $40.0M in 1929/30, or from about $50 per capita to 
around $135, while fishery products fell from some 80% to 40% of total ex-
ports.39 Indeed, per capita exports from Newfoundland were higher than in 
Canada, which stood at $40 in 1911 and $115 in 1929. But given the small 
volume of domestic production for home consumption, Newfoundland 
needed very high' levels of exports per capita to emulate the North American 
pattern of consumption which, as Smallwood noted, was increasingly emu-
lated and desired.40 Moreover, the gains to levels of consumption from rising 
per capita exports could not have been very great since, as Table 3 suggests, 
the export price indices of countries from which Newfoundland drew most of 
her imports rose by 40% to 60% between the immediate pre-war years and 
the second half of the 1920s. Secondly, duties as a percentage of imports rose 
from around 20% to 28% over the period,41 and expenditures for servicing 
foreign debt rose from 20% of revenue in 1919-20 to 35% in 1929-30.42 Thirdly, 
the per capita value of exports in pre-war Newfoundland reflected much more 
realistically returns for consumption to factors of production in Newfound-
land than was the case by the late 1920s. The new resource industries in min-
ing and forest products, which accounted for over 55% of the value of exports 
in 1929-30, required substantial payments out of the gross value of sales for 
capital depreciation, payments to foreign suppliers of intermediate inputs 
and non-resident management and ownership. For the same reason, the ap-
parent diversification of the economy is misleading. Newfoundland had pro-
gressed from a domestically owned one product export economy to a sub-
stantially foreign owned three product export economy, for in 1929-30 some 
98% of exports were accounted for by fish, forest, and mineral products. 
Diversification of output for the export economy had no dramatic impact 
on the distribution of the labour force. In Table 4 the apparently strong 
growth in service employment and the decline in secondary shares between 
1911 and 1935 is largely a statistical illusion arising either from a failure to 
enumerate personal service before 1935, or its allocation to 'Others' in earlier 
periods. The Table suggests a continuation of long-run trends rather than 
sharp discontinuities. Relative to the labour force, primary employment was 
declining, service employment was increasing, but secondary employment 
was stabilizing at around 20-25% of labour force. This was the share reached 
in the 1890s when the modern transportation, communications and construc-
39 DBS, Statistical Background, Table 97. 
40 New Newfoundland, p. 211. 
41 DBS, Statistical Background, Table 97. 
42 Dominons Office, Newfoundland Royal Commission, Report (London, 1933, Cmnd. 4480), 
pp. 57, 63. 
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tion labour force began to emerge. Fishing and lumbering in 1935 continued 
to employ almost half the labour force, while factory and shop employment, 
despite the paper mills and electrical power stations, still employed only 
about 7%, while all occupations in the service sector showed small relative 
gains. The modern resource industries attracted to Newfoundland since the 
turn of the century had had a much greater impact on the composition of 
domestic product than on the structure of the labour force. The trends in 
labour's sectoral allocation were the same as those affecting other countries 
in the western world,43 but the strength of demand for labour in Newfound-
land's non-primary sectors and the growth of labour productivity in the pri-
mary sector had generated a much slower pace of transition than elsewhere. 
Thus, while the employment trends were toward the 'modern' allocation, at 
each date the secondary sector and, to a lesser degree, the service sector 
were more weakly developed. 
Table 5 compares the sectoral allocation of employment with distribution 
of earning in 1935 and gives the resulting sectoral average per capita earnings. 
The Table is misleading as to the share in earning of the fishing industry in 
'normal' times, as the price collapse of fish products was more severe than in 
other export industries. Still, even if the export value of fish products for 
1928/29 (some $16M) is allocated entirely to labour income in Newfoundland 
and no adjustment is made for depressed earnings in other sectors — ob-
viously a gross bias in favour of the fishing industry in normal times — the 
sector would have received only about 45% of earnings, and per capita earn-
ings would have stood at around $350. It is more likely that in good years 
some 35-40% of earnings went to this sector which, according to the 1935 
census, directly and indirectly employed and supported some 40% of the 
population. It is true that fishermen had to outfit themselves from earnings, 
but it is also the case that non-market income was more available to the rural 
than the urban labour force. The best guess is that in normal times standards 
of living for the mass of workers in the fishing sector did not differ sharply 
from those for the mass of workers in other sectors of the economy. If this is 
so, then the reason for the small absolute decline of the fishing labour force 
in the first half of the twentieth century is not simply a function of employ-
ment potential in other sectors. The critical fact is that the economy as a 
whole could not provide sufficient employment for the growing population 
and potential labour force, necessitating emigration from both urban and 
rural sectors. With stronger growth in secondary and tertiary sectors the level 
of emigration would have fallen, but it would have required a massive boom 
in demand for secondary and service output and a correspondingly sharp rise 
in per capita earnings in those sectors to have attracted large amounts of 
labour out of the primary sector. 
43 See Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth (New Haven, 1966), ch. 3. 
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TABLE 5 
OCCUPATIONS AND EARNINGS IN NEWFOUNDLAND 1935 
All Industries 
Forestry, Fishing, Trapping 
Services: 
-Professional (Male) 
-Public Administration (Male) 
-Personal Service (Female) 
Unspecified 
Trade 
Manufacturing 
Transportation and Communication 
Agriculture 
Construction 
Mining 
Electric Power 
Finance 
% Total 
Employment 
(88,710) 
48 % 
15 
1.3 
2.3 
6.5 
8 
7 
7 
5 
5 
3 
2 
0 (0.3) 
0 (0.2) 
% Total 
Earnings 
($24,952,700) 
24 % 
19 
5.4 
6 
2 
4 
16 
14 
10 
4 
4 
4 
1 
1 
Per Capita 
Earnings 
($280) 
$ 140 
350 
830 
750 
60 
140 
640 
610 
500 
155 
350 
500 
1,100 
1,350 
NOTE: All calculations are rounded in the major breakdowns to the nearest 1%. 
SOURCE: Calculated from Tenth Census of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1935. 
The Newfoundland government struggled with the prospect of bankruptcy 
during the early years of the Depression, and finally surrendered independence 
and Dominion status early in 1934. The Commission appointed from Britain a 
year earlier to review the causes of impending collapse, attributed it largely 
to the irresponsibility of politicians in the management of public funds.44 But 
from its own evidence it is difficult to make the case that there was a riot of 
spending. Revenues grew steadily from S8.4M in 1920/21 to S11.6M in 1929/ 
30, but current expenditures actually declined from $8.9M to $7.2M and in 
every year between were under $7M.45 It is true that the budget was in surplus 
only in 1924/25, whereas it was in surplus in every year after 1922 in Canada; 
but the great development expenditures of the Canadian government were 
over by the 1920s, whereas in the twenty-eight years between 1885 and 1913 
the Canadian budget had been in deficit in all but six of those years.46 In 1933 
the per capita public debt in Newfoundland stood at around $344 compared 
44 1933 Commission, op. cit., p. 43. 
45 Ibid., pp. 57, 63. 
46 Calculated from Historical Statistics of Canada, Series 621-24 and 626-44. 
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with $540 for all levels of government in Canada,47 which given relative in-
come levels implied a heavier burden in Newfoundland.48 Analysis of the 
Newfoundland public debt in 1933 shows that 35% was attributable to de-
velopment of the railway; 60% was accounted for by the railway and other 
development expenditures on fisheries, agriculture, schools, roads, urban 
development and similar accounts; that over 70% was chargeable to these 
and the war debt, and finally that the lion's share of borrowings made to 
cover budget deficits was in order to keep the railway operating.49 
Whatever the peccadillos of its politicians, Newfoundland's collapse was 
not the result of corruption or even unwise, as distinct from unfruitful, spend-
ing of public funds. With the grant of responsible government, Newfoundland 
had set out to replicate the economic performance of its continental neigh-
bours. The levels and patterns of North American consumption were the goal, 
and it is not surprising that development strategies to achieve it were im-
ported as well. From hindsight, some of the reasons for failure are apparent. 
The matter of scale was crucial, for it was only by the output of massive 
volumes of several primary products and the simultaneous enlargement of 
domestic markets, that servicing of development expenditures could be 
covered, a measure of isolation from the swings of international prices 
secured, and dependence upon external capital markets reduced. Newfound-
land was unfortunate. The economy was too narrowly based to benefit from 
war demand in 1914-18 and at best only a small commodity trade surplus was 
achieved. Moreover, unlike Canada, Newfoundland had to finance much of 
her war effort by borrowing in London and New York. The economy emerged 
from the war without a sharply diversified structure or increased capacity, 
with a casualty ridden labour force, and an increased external debt. 
In the 1920s weak primary product prices offered no relief, and unlike 
Canada the country could not escape from the treadmill of external borrow-
ing to service existing debt and to seek the elusive breakthrough into modern 
economic growth and structure. Hence the country was extremely vulnerable 
in the face of the international economic crisis which was steadily building 
throughout the 1920s. Newfoundland's export earnings dropped by 22% in 
1930/31 - 1934/35 over their level in 1925/26 - 1929/30 - a rather modest 
decline compared with the almost 50% collapse in Canada's foreign earnings 
in 1931-35 over 1925-29.50 But the smaller percentage decline had a much 
47 Calculated from 1933 Commission, op. cit., p. 253; Historical Statistics of Newfoundland, 
Table A-l, and Historical Statistics of Canada, Series 696-710. 
48 In Canada in 1933 debt charges of all governments as a per cent of revenues amounted to 
40% as compared with 63% for Newfoundland in 1932/33. Calculated from Historical Statis-
tics of Canada, Series 662-82, 683-710, and 1933 Commission, op. cit., pp. 57, 63. 
49 Calculated from 1933 Commission, op. cit., p. 253. 
50 Calculated from DBS, Statistical Background, Table 97, and Historical Statistics of Canada, 
Series F242-245. 
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greater impact on Newfoundland since a larger share of national income was 
derived from foreign trade, the fishing industry (which was the most impor-
tant in terms of payment to resident factors) was most severely hit, and 
government revenues, out of which payments on development capital had 
to be met, were almost entirely derived from customs. 
Emulation of the style of life and the development strategies by which the 
new continental countries had achieved it, resulted in ruin for Smallwood's 
'New Newfoundland'. For the impatient public servants of the 1933 Royal 
Commission, it was a case of a "people misled into the acceptance of false 
standards" and a "country sunk in waste and extravagance."51 A blunter con-
clusion was reached in the 1940s by MacKay and Saunders: "the Newfound-
land economy cannot, in normal times, provide the revenue required to sup-
ply the Island with the public services demanded by a Western people". "In 
short, Newfoundland was not a fit place for white men, or at least very many 
of them. 
E. H. Carr has suggested that history rarely repeats itself because man is 
conscious of the past.53 But in Newfoundland the past has not been well 
understood and the range of choice has been severely restricted. After the 
1934 collapse succeeding decades have brought a repetition of earlier de-
velopment cycles. During Commission Government in the 1930s and 1940s, 
attention reverted to improving the efficiency and expanding the capacity of 
indigenous enterprise; in the 1950s and 1960s as a province of Canada, there 
was a further round on 'infastructure' investment and strenuous efforts to woo 
international capital and corporations. In the 1970s the province confronts 
the highest per capita debt and burden of taxation and the lowest credit rating 
in Canada. Almost half of provincial revenues are transfers from the federal 
government, and consumer expenditure and private investment is heavily 
supported by direct and indirect federal expenditures and transfers. The level 
of unemployment hovers around 20% of a labour force with a low participa-
tion rate, and many of the provinces hard-won industrial projects, such as the 
electric reduction plant, the linerboard mill and the oil refinery, are either 
heavily subsidized or operating at a loss. The Labrador mineral and hydro-
electric projects have not generated major returns to the province and their 
prospect for further expansion is now dim. On the Island and coastal Labrador 
a large rural population remains, reluctant to move to the Mainland, and de-
pendent upon the tattered remnants of a once great fishing industry wrecked 
by unfavourable trends in the international economy and hopelessly ineffec-
51 1933 Commission, op. cit., p. 43. 
52 MacKay, Newfoundland, p. 190. 
53 What is History? (New York, 1972 ed.), pp. 84-89. 
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tive national trade and fisheries policies.54 As Newfoundlanders once hoped 
that paper and mining companies would finally bring prosperity, they now 
await the discoveries of international oil companies on the Labrador coast. 
If there are lessons from the past, however, they suggest that the province's 
natural potential lies on the sea, not the land, and that international resource 
corporations will not effect the economic transformation so long awaited. 
It might be wiser for Newfoundland to define and accept more modest goals 
and expectations, or perhaps more accurately, different ones. The develop-
ment which a country achieves is not simply a quantitative measure of real 
output, but a qualitative valuation of the levels and patterns of consumption 
secured with that output, and its mental independence from valuations made 
by other influential countries. A tropical island will be poor no matter how 
much fish, fruit, sunshine and leisure its economy can provide if its people 
want, or are persuaded to want, cars and apartment towers. It is possible 
Newfoundland could develop a more prosperous economy and more self-
confident society if its people adjusted to a pattern of consumption some-
what different from that of the Mainland, and its labour and capital were 
more effectively linked to its obvious natural endowment. 
54 This issue is to be detailed in a forthcoming monograph by the author on the post 1945 
Newfoundland fishing industry. 
